Last Fair Deal Gone Down.

I seldom visit Next Door, but here and there it's an informative resource, as when a well-attended thread began under the title of "Drag Strip on Elm Street."

The last time I recall this topic being raised by elected and appointed officials was in late June, when city council discussed speeding and other examples of forever escalating driver mayhem in New Albany.

The council's discussion was followed by a revealing intervention by the Board of Public Works and Safety's appointed chairman Warren Nash, who hastened to remind elected public officials that there was no need to discuss problems that don't exist.

But don't take my word for it. After all, I don't attend meetings any longer, in an act of self-censorship explained in depth here: ON THE AVENUES: Surrender.

Rather, believe Daniel Suddeath of the News and Tribune, who quoted Nash on June 23.

NEW ALBANY — Last week, the New Albany City Council kicked around a few ideas for traffic calming, though the only decision reached was to convene a committee to further explore the issue.

On Tuesday, Warren Nash, president of the New Albany Board of Public Works and Safety, urged the committee and council to be cautious in its approach due to a major improvement project slated to begin next year on the Sherman Minton Bridge.

“I hope your committee will take into account the Sherman Minton Bridge construction during the next two years and not do anything too drastic during that time,” Nash said to Councilman Jason Applegate, chair of the traffic committee that was scheduled to meet Tuesday evening for the first time since the pandemic.

Applegate regularly attends the board of works meetings, which will resume being held in-person likely on July 7, and explained that the committee’s intent isn’t to propose massive projects or to attempt to overstep its bounds.

The board of works oversees city streets as part of its domain while the council is primarily in charge of funding and managing municipal budgets.

Applegate said the committee would like to see a process streamlined “that gets information in kind of a systematic way where maybe there’s a liaison between the council and the board of works on these types of issues.”

The board of works is a three-person body and its members are appointed by the mayor.

Nash referred to the council’s discussion Thursday about speeding and traffic calming. He said he heard several issues raised regarding streets that the board already has projects planned for or where upgrades are in process.

He mentioned some traffic-calming measures and upgrades for Grant Line Road, Mount Tabor Road, McDonald Lane and Slate Run Road, among others.

“We’ve done traffic calming and slowed traffic down on all of those streets, so I think we’ve done a considerable amount of slowing traffic down,” Nash said.

If I've misinterpreted Suddeath's quote, I'm open and eager to be corrected.

Beak wetting 101: "Why Does Infrastructure Cost So Much?"

You're advised to click through and read Marohn's essay in its entirety. In the interim, the points below are significant. I've underlined a key passage from the standpoint of our experience in Pay to Play City.

Why Does Infrastructure Cost So Much?, by Charles Marohn (Strong Towns)

... There are many technical reasons why infrastructure is so expensive—pick your favorite as they are all elusive to broadly discern—but it's clear that there are two underlying drivers that are not merely technical.

The first underlying driver of U.S. infrastructure costs is that the U.S. has felt so rich as a country that, for decades, we spent freely on infrastructure and never asked serious questions about the return on that investment. Never. As I’ve suggested many times, a study of human behavior in complex environments suggests that, with an abundance of resources, complex feedback loops break down. At this point, it’s difficult to identify one underlying cause because the real cause is systematic. And worse, the players involved work in single-discipline silos where a standard way of operating has become normalized; they don’t even know which questions to ask.

Do we really need a third interchange or can we get by with the two we have? (Traffic counts justify a third and we have two big box stores ready to build.) Do we really need to acquire that five feet of right-of-way so we can have 12-foot lanes when 11.5 foot lanes would be just fine? (Of course we do because that’s our standard.) Do we really need to pay a premium price for that five feet of land, as if it were valuable real estate in Manhattan and not the edge of some parking lot buffer? (Of course, unless you want the project delayed for years and for every case to end up in court.) Do we need ten signs or can we get by with eight? (Remember that one time we were threatened with a lawsuit—don’t want any chance of that happening.)

Individually, these are all reasonable reactions, especially when viewed from within a professional bubble that focuses on one or two metrics for success. Collectively, they are disastrous. The richer you are, the more you can throw money at solving your problems. The more money you can throw at a problem, the less you are confronted with the nuances of that problem and the less pressure there is to be creative. The complex becomes merely complicated. Painful feedback and uncomfortable balancing of priorities are avoided. Costs go up and nobody understands just why.

It’s also important to note that technical professions within the engineering and construction fields have a lot of built-in incentives to not think too critically about this problem. Compensation schedules are often written as a percent of project costs (the more things cost, the more the compensation). When public agencies prioritize fewer, larger projects, it means fewer players making cost decisions, spawning a kind of informal collusion even within a system of competitive bidding. It’s way more rewarding—especially among your peers within a profession—to complain about cheap taxpayers and politicians than to systematically question your own industry practices (trust me, I know).

It’s a little like asking teachers why the cost of public education is so high or asking doctors why medical costs keep going up. Both professions have their preferred scapegoat—administrators and insurance companies, respectively—but neither is in a real position to objectively evaluate their own contribution to the problem. That makes them human, not corrupt. But being human is nonetheless deeply flawed in this regard.

The second underlying driver of U.S. infrastructure costs is how deeply embedded infrastructure spending is within our model of economic growth. We have to spend on infrastructure because we don’t have a mechanism to experience broad economic growth without it, and we must have broad economic growth or everything in our Ponzi-bubble economy will collapse. It’s really that simple.

Stuck in traffic? Pay close attention: "Here’s how 'induced demand' works."

Graph courtesy of Vox.

They're calling it CityLab University for a reason. The linked article isn't a meme, and it probably can't be read in the time it takes to skim a News and Tribune article.

However, your diligence will be rewarded.

Along with the daily output at Strong Towns, CityLab is essential reading for those seeking to understand how these things work. All our public officials should be reading these essays and others like them.

Are they?

CityLab University: Induced Demand, by Benjamin Schneider (CityLab)

It’s time again for “CityLab University,” a resource for understanding some of the most important concepts related to cities and urban policy. If you like this feature, have constructive feedback, or would like to see a similar explainer on other topics, drop us a line at editors@citylab.com.

When traffic-clogged highways are expanded, new drivers quickly materialize to fill them. What gives? Here’s how “induced demand” works.

With 26 lanes at its widest point, the Katy Freeway in the Houston metro is the Mississippi River of car infrastructure. Its current girth, which by some measures makes it the widest freeway in North America, was the result of an expansion project that took place between 2008 and 2011 at a cost of $2.8 billion. The primary reason for this mega-project was to alleviate severe traffic congestion.

And yet, after the freeway was widened, congestion got worse. An analysis by Joe Cortright of City Observatory used data from Houston’s official traffic monitoring agency to find that travel times increased by 30 percent during the morning commute and 55 percent during the evening commute between 2011 and 2014. A local TV station found similar increases.

The Sisyphean saga of the Katy Freeway is a textbook example of a counterintuitive urban transportation phenomenon that has vexed drivers, planners, and politicians since the dawn of the automobile age: induced demand.

KEY POINTS

• In urbanism, “induced demand” refers to the idea that increasing roadway capacity encourages more people to drive, thus failing to improve congestion.
• Since the concept was introduced in the 1960s, numerous academic studies have demonstrated the existence of ID.
• But some economists argue that the effects of ID are overstated, or outweighed by the benefits of greater automobility.
• Few federal, state, and local departments of transportation are thought to adequately account for ID in their long-term planning.

SUMMARY

Nearly all freeway expansions and new highways are sold to the public as a means of reducing traffic congestion. It’s a logical enough proposition, one that certainly makes plenty of sense to anyone who’s stuck in traffic: Small communities served by small roads grow bigger, and their highways need to grow with them. More lanes creates more capacity, meaning cars should be able to pass through faster. But that’s not what always happens once these projects are completed.

Just as with the Katy Freeway expansion, adding new roadway capacity also creates new demand for those lanes or roads, maintaining a similar rate of congestion, if not worsening it. Economists call this phenomenon induced demand: When you provide more of something, or provide it for a cheaper price, people are more likely to use it. Rather than thinking of traffic as a liquid, which requires a certain volume of space to pass through at a given rate, induced demand demonstrates that traffic is more like a gas, expanding to fill up all the space it is allowed.

Transportation researchers have been observing induced demand since at least the 1960s, when the economist Anthony Downs coined his Law of Peak Hour Traffic Congestion, which states that “on urban commuter expressways, peak-hour traffic congestion rises to meet maximum capacity.”

This list is helpful, too.

Further Reading

“Highway Boondoggles 3”

“The Fundamental Law of Road Congestion”

“Increasing Highway Capacity Unlikely to Relieve Congestion”

“online.trb.org/doi/abs/10.3141/2653-02?journalCode=trr" style="box-sizing: inherit; color: black;">Closing the Induced Vehicle Travel Gap Between Research and Practice”

“Generated Traffic and Induced Travel: Implications for Transport Planning”

Stuck in Traffic: Coping With Peak Hour Traffic Congestion

This means you: "STOP FUCKING DRIVING YOUR CAR AT PEOPLE."

This insightful comment to a fine rant clarifies the problem of bad design affecting outcomes. Perhaps Larry Summers can elucidate, assuming Dear Leader permits "truthful dialogue" within city limits.

"This is largely a problem of bad design of North American intersections, compounded by MUTCD and its Canadian equivalent. Cut to Germany (and many other places), where traffic lights are aligned between the stop line and the crosswalk. There are no traffic signals on the opposite side of the intersection (though in places like the UK, there will be two lights at the stop line, on either side of the nearside, and one light on the far side). This forces drivers to stop before the crosswalk and makes it almost impossible for drivers to see the light if they pull forward. North American roadway design is dangerous in its neglect for the safety of pedestrians."

We already know what Pat McLaughlin would say: "Can't they just drive like everyone else who matters?"

Meanwhile, the author is Canadian, and the problem is universal.

STOP FUCKING DRIVING YOUR CAR AT PEOPLE, by Jonathan McLeod (Steps from the Canal)

Often when I’m crossing a street–on my bike or walking or walking with my small children–a driver will be slowly driving at me. They’ll be creeping past the stop line and into the crosswalk, hoping to go through right after I clear their fender. Make no mistake, I’ll have the right of way. They’ll be waiting at a stop sign or looking to turn right on a red.

A lot of you do this, and here’s the thing; I don’t care how nice you are out of your car, how caring, how altruistic, how thoughtful; when you do this, when you creep towards a vulnerable road user–especially young children–you’re being an asshole.

Stop it. It’s rude. It’s threatening. It’s selfish. It’s intimidating. It’s fucking dangerous.

Recently, a New York driver did this. And she killed a one-year-old and three-year-old, and sent a pregnant woman to the hospital. From the story:

The woman told officers that she was creeping up a bit at the intersection in anticipation of the red light changing and then accidentally hit the accelerator, according to the Post report, which cited information from sources.

Make no mistake about it, this woman is a murderer, if the word is to mean anything at all. She intentionally drove her car at people, then “accidentally” accelerated at them.

Because New York authorities take things so seriously, they let the killer go ...

"Why does this type of thing get people’s blood boiling behind the wheel?"

An observation, one I've offered previously: Those of us who walk, especially near urban streets like New Albany's misplaced arterial one-way neighborhood killers, are perfectly placed to see how badly most of us drive (and I include myself in "us"). Street design can help reduce instances of stupidity.

Serious Question: Why Does Losing a Few Seconds Lead to Road Rage?, by Angie Schmitt (Streetsblog)

If you’ve ever biked on a city street — or even just driven a little below the speed limit — you’ve probably encountered this situation: A driver behind you starts honking in irritation, then races past you at frightening speed only to hit a red light at the next intersection.

What is the source of all that aggression?

Metered parking in Berkeley: "How the changes affect behavior."

We've experience metered paywalls recently, but what about the merits of parking meters?

It's hard to imagine a more controversial and counterintuitive topic -- no one wants to pay to park, right? But last week while in downtown Indianapolis, it was a breeze to find a streetside spot, swipe the credit card for dollar-an-hour parking, and go about our business on foot. We calculated how much time was needed for our objectives, and took up space only for these tasks.

If, as Jeff Speck proposes, parking revenues are put back into an infrastructure development pool for the benefit of the area around the meters, it sounds like a vast improvement on New Albany's frankly counterproductive method of suspending parking ordinances downtown, which has the effect of making parking value-less, while allowing indolent and unsupervised employees to park where shoppers should be parking, without penalty. Meanwhile, up the street and past an invisible line, the same ordinances are enforced. How does any of this make sense?

Maybe somewhere there's a secret plan.

Metered parking changes launch Tuesday in Berkeley, by Emilie Raguso (Berkeleyside)

... The goBerkeley model is based on the concept of “demand-responsive” pricing, so that prices reflect demand in several congested areas around town. The hope is to free up one or two spaces per block, by raising or adjusting the pricing in a way that will encourage some of the people currently filling spaces to move a bit farther away or use alternative modes of transportation. The city has been studying current parking demand, and plans to analyze how the changes affect behavior.

Will not think for food.

A recent discussion with friends concerning local food production and distribution-- or, more specifically, the lack thereof-- got me wondering about the economic impact of non-local food sales.

To wit, I was able to reference a 2005 study completed by IU Southeast faculty members Jon Bingham, M.A. and Dagney Faulk, Ph.D. and published in the Indiana Business Review, for information about local food expenditures.

By using the low-cost plan from Official USDA Food Plans: Cost of Food at Home at Four Levels, U.S. Average, December 2004 and adjusting it to Midwest pricing, Bingham and Faulk were able to determine that average monthly food costs for variously configured families of two or more in our region range from $353 to $599.

The 2000 census shows 21,057 households in Floyd County with two or more people. Obviously, there are 12 months in a year.

$353 x 21,057 x 12 = $89,197,452

$599 X 21,057 X 12 = $151,357,716

Assuming that all food is prepared in-house, our annual county expenditure on home cooked meals is between $89.2 million and $151.4 million, not including the over 6,000 single person households.

In fairness, some of the money spent undoubtedly goes toward local wages to the extent our mostly chain grocery stores provide employment. The trouble is that those typically low-paying jobs are one of the few mechanisms we have for local food dollar retention.

I admittedly know very little about the food retail business but, if profit from such operations in Floyd County is calculated using the study numbers and the 6% net profit rate reported by large grocery chains a few years ago, it amounts to between $5.4 million and $9.1 million annually, the large majority of which is removed from our local economy and transferred to out-of-state corporate entities along with the jobs and tax revenues those dollars generate.

According to the Louisville Independent Business Alliance, independent local businesses do a much better job of keeping our dollars in the community via a multiplier effect, that is, by hiring other local firms to provide services like accounting, construction, signage, legal representation, and insurance. For every $100 spent at a community-based business, $45 goes back into the local economy. A typical corporate chain only returns $13 per $100.

On the low end of our annual food expenditures, $89.2 million spent with local food merchants would return approximately $40.1 million to our local economy. The same amount spent at a chain would retain only $11.6 million. If we purchase from out-of-state corporations, our grocery buying habits cost the local and state economy $28.5 million per year in Floyd County alone and it's only one of 92 counties in the state.

Not satisfied with that self-flagellation, we sometimes compound our losses by offering tax abatements to non-local grocery chains as an enticement to locate here. Doing so not only makes our economy and tax base less sustainable, but also encourages significant additional shipping with associated cost increases in traffic congestion, infrastructure maintenance, and negative environmental impact. Moreover, it ties food costs more closely to fuel costs. When we demand more fuel to ship all of our food, we ultimately pay more for both.

As our food purchasing model is replicated from county to county and state to state, those costs increase exponentially, leaving us holding the bag- a grocery bag in this case, with much less in it.

There are lots of ways to starve ourselves. It's unfortunate that we've figured out how to make buying food one of them.