Showing posts with label Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Show all posts

Saturday, September 24, 2016

On dying (1): A new book about FDR's last months.

We can argue these points forever, but the fact remains that in 1945 the Red Army occupied the territories in eastern central Europe subsequently slated for duty as Soviet satellites, and given an ongoing war with Japan (and general Patton notwithstanding), there was little the United States could have done about it short of continuing military operations against the USSR.

Did Roosevelt's failing health have anything to do with any of this? I don't think so.

Stalin specialized in fostering delusion in the minds of wishful thinkers. Did Ronald Reagan's creeping dementia hasten the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the belated "end" of World War II? It's probably irrelevant, because by this juncture, Mikhail Gorbachev had assumed the role of wishful thinker.

Meanwhile, issues of presidential health have resurfaced during the reeking 2016 presidential debacle. Shall we have a discussion of whether Tim Kaine or Mike Pence is capable of carrying Harry Truman's jockstrap?

If so, you can count me out. I'm investing in booze futures as a hedge against the coming stupidity. Either way, you'll all be getting exactly what you deserve -- good and hard.

Did F.D.R. Know He Was Dying? Did Anyone? by Lynne Olson (New York Times)

HIS FINAL BATTLE
The Last Months of Franklin Roosevelt
By Joseph Lelyveld
Illustrated. 399 pp. Alfred A. Knopf. $30.

 ... Roosevelt’s cover-up of his failing health in the 1944 campaign was an egregious deception of American voters and helped contribute to a climate of cynicism about politicians that has fed today’s demands for transparency by candidates, including the public airing of details about their health and finances. By refusing to confront the possibility of his dying, Roosevelt also left behind a hornet’s nest of problems for others. He failed, for example, to brief his new vice president, Harry Truman, about such critical issues as the development of the atomic bomb and the West’s unraveling relationship with the Soviets.

Lelyveld offers several explanations for Roose­velt’s silence, including the rationale that he was no different from earlier presidents in his “arms-length relationship” with his vice president. In fact, thanks to his grave illness, Roosevelt was in a very different position. His reluctance to acknowledge that fact ended up making life extremely difficult for his unprepared successor, who was forced to make crucial decisions about both the atomic bomb and the Soviets in the first few months of his presidency.

There’s also the continuing controversy about whether Roosevelt’s obvious frailty impaired his judgment at Yalta ...

Sunday, April 14, 2013

From The March to Fear Itself.

E. L. Doctorow’s 2006 novel The March is historical fiction, a genre I tend to avoid, having always preferred my history straight, not imagined.

However, my wife recently bought a copy for me, and truth be told, I actually enjoyed it. The upper-case March in question is William Tecumseh Sherman’s, along with tens of thousands of his troops. It began in the autumn 1864 after the capture of Atlanta, and ended in springtime in North Carolina with the surrender of the Confederacy in 1865.

In some quarters, it was considered sheer lunacy for an army of this size to plunge unsupplied and blind into hostile territory during wet and cold months considered the least suitable for movement, much less combat itself – and given that Sherman was prone to a measure of psychological imbalance, it probably was.

One factor that astounded foreign observers of the day was the improvisational ability of Sherman’s engineers to improvise solutions to mobility hindrances such as flooded rivers and vast swamps. Corduroying muddy roads and building pontoon bridges also provided outlets for the labor of freed slaves, who followed Sherman’s army in huge numbers, confounding the Union leader’s fragile patience.

The novel can be criticized for a handful of clichéd characterizations, and perhaps there is a certain absence of depth, but then again, Sherman’s March was not an exercise in subtlety. It was an extended, months-long exercise in calculated destruction, state-sanctioned search and confiscation, and the relentless daily bludgeoning of the South’s will to remain in a state of rebellion.

Conceptually, Sherman’s March reflected the grim certainty of its progenitor and his immediate military superior, Ulysses S. Grant, that the best way to bring the destruction of civil war to a halt was to apply maximum force to bear, as violently and incessantly as possible, whatever the misery and human cost.

After the rebels were beaten, it then would be left to the skills of the philosopher president, A. Lincoln, who fully approved of Grant’s and Sherman’s strategy of attrition – of bleeding the Confederacy dry – to re-stitch the national fabric. As we know, Lincoln did not live to participate in the aftermath.

Had he survived, it might not have altered the sad course of Reconstruction. In the end, the American Civil War resolved everything, and it resolved nothing, and the reason for this length prelude is a review in last Sunday’s New York Times of a book that explores a little-discussed aspect of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.

The President Proposes . . . ‘Fear Itself,’ a book by Ira Katznelson, reviewed by Kevin Boyle (New York Times)

 ... One connection, though, Katznelson considers utterly Faust­ian: to push their legislative programs through Congress, the New Dealers sold their souls to the segregated South.

The calculation was simple enough. Thanks to the disfranchisement of blacks and the reign of terror that accompanied it, the South had become solidly Democratic by the beginning of the 20th century, the Deep South exclusively so. One-party rule translated into outsize power on Capitol Hill: when Roosevelt took office, Southerners held almost half the Democrats’ Congressional seats and many of the key committee chairmanships. So whatever Roosevelt wanted to put into law had to have Southern approval. And he wouldn’t get it if he dared to challenge the region’s racial order.

Katznelson spends much of “Fear Itself” detailing the dismal results ...